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1 
PLAIN ERROR REVIEW IS JUST PLAIN 
CONFUSING: HOW THE CONFUSED STATE OF 
PLAIN ERROR REVIEW LED THE SEVENTH 
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David Resnick was accused of sexually abusing two young boys, 
among other charges.1 FBI special agents twice asked Resnick to 
submit to a polygraph examination, and twice he refused.2 In his first 
refusal, Resnick asserted that he would have to speak to his lawyer 
before submitting to the polygraph test, noting that polygraph tests 
were unreliable.3 At trial the prosecution introduced testimony about 
Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph test and argued it was evidence 
of his guilt during closing arguments.4 After a four-day trial, the jury 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Psychology, University of California—Los Angeles. 
1 United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc 
denied, 835 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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convicted Resnick on all four counts5 and he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.6 
In United States v. Resnick, since the defense did not object to the 
prosecution’s adversarial use of Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph 
test at trial, the Seventh Circuit applied plain error review to assess 
whether Resnick’s conviction should be reversed.7 After applying 
plain error analysis, the majority held that even though the prosecution 
might have violated Resnick’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, the violation nonetheless failed to rise to the level of 
plain error.8  
Plain error analysis is the type of appellate review applied when a 
party fails to object to an error at the moment it happens during trial.9 
Because of the interest in the finality of judgments, parties are 
encouraged to make timely objections.10 To incentivize timely 
objections, Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
prescribes that a party loses its right to appeal an error if an objection 
to it is not contemporaneously made.11 However, cases from the early 
twentieth century held that the public interest required that courts 
correct errors that harmed the integrity of the judicial system, even 
when such errors were not timely objected to.12 
In the last thirty years, the plain error doctrine has changed 
substantially both in principle and in form. Interpretations by the 
United States Supreme Court have vastly departed from its original 
                                                 
5 The counts included aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, interstate 
transportation of child pornography, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime, 
and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 892. 
6 Id. In addition to the life sentence, Resnick received a consecutive seven-year 
sentence.  
7 Id. at 896. 
8 Id. at 898.   
9 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); United States v. Frady, 
456 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1982). 
10 See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163. 
11 Id. at 162. 
12 See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936); New York C.R. 
Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 (1929). 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
3 
articulation. Rather than serving as a protection for both the accused 
and the whole of society, its current rigidity provides restitution for 
only those lucky enough to be able to prove their innocence, with little 
regard for the public’s faith in the fairness of our justice system. The 
principles in which plain error review is grounded must be revisited 
and the standard revised. 
Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the plain error doctrine within the last thirty years and the resultant 
inconsistent applications by the Court and the Seventh Circuit. Part II 
of this article analyzes and critiques Resnick’s holding. Finally, Part III 
proposes a revised version of plain error review more closely aligned 
with the spirit of the original standard. 
 




Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) is a codification of the 
plain error review standard set forth in United States v. Atkinson.13 
Rule 52(b) provides that “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights 
may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s 
attention.”14  
In Atkinson,15 the Supreme Court acknowledged that a verdict 
would not ordinarily be set aside for an error not objected to at trial.16 
                                                 
13 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).  
14 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
15 297 U.S. 157 (1936). Atkinson involved a civil action brought against the 
United States by a plaintiff seeking payment from war risk insurance. He claimed 
that under the policy, loss of hearing in both ears constituted a total disability. The 
district court found against the government. On appeal, the government claimed that 
the jury instruction erroneously stated that the jury could find for the plaintiff on the 
theory that the plaintiff’s loss of hearing in both years, if permanent, was a 
permanent disability as defined by the policy. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district’s court’s holding. The Supreme Court, noting that the government had failed 
to make a timely objection to the jury instruction, held that any potential error 
presented by the government was not exceptional enough to correct. Id. at 158-60. 
16 Id. at 160. 
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The Court, however, conceded that an appellate court could, under 
special circumstances, make an exception to this rule.17 The Court 
went on to explain when this exception might be appropriate: 
 
In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, 
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own 
motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if 
the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.18 
 
This came to be known as the original plain review standard.19 
This standard focused on the obviousness of the error and its effect on 
judicial fairness, reputation, and integrity.20 In other words, an error 
was reversible if it was so palpable that not addressing it would harm 
the integrity of the judicial system or if the error tarnished the judicial 
system in any other way.21 After the Atkinson standard was codified by 
Rule 52(b) in 1944, the type of analysis to determine whether there 
was an error in need of curing came to be known as “plain error 
review.”22 Today’s incarnation of this standard is very distinct from the 
original version.23 Rather than focusing on the effect of the error on 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (emphasis added). Johnson, which Atkinson cited after laying down its 
standard, placed emphasis on the fact that the integrity and fairness of trials were of 
public concern and that this public imperative gave the court authority to correct trial 
errors even when objections were not timely made. “The public interest requires that 
the court of its own motion, as is its power and duty, protect suitors in their right to a 
verdict uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice. Where such 
paramount considerations are involved, the failure of counsel to particularize an 
exception will not preclude this Court from correcting the error.” Johnson, 279 U.S. 
at 318-19 (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)). 
19 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
20 See Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160. 
21 See id.; Johnson, 279 U.S. at 318-19. 
22 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
23 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993). 
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5 
the public’s faith in the judicial system, the standard now narrowly 
centers on the outcome of the particular case.24 
 
B. Inconsistent Application of Plain Error Review by the 
Supreme Court 
 
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
plain error review standard inconsistently in different cases, leading to 
confusion about the standard’s proper application. This inconsistency 
is evidenced by the Court’s decisions in United States v. Young,25 
United States v. Olano,26 Johnson v. United States,27 and United States 
v. Dominguez Benitez.28  
In Young, the Court deviated from the Atkinson paradigm and 
added an additional variable to plain error analysis—the weight of the 
evidence against the accused.29 This deviation laid the foundation for 
the current version of plain error review in which the error is looked at 
side-by-side with the evidence against the defendant.30 The addition of 
this variable initiated the Court’s shift away from the Atkinson 
framework toward a standard more closely resembling the cause and 
actual prejudice standard used in collateral review.31  
                                                 
24 See id.; Young, 470 U.S. at 19-20. 
25 470 U.S. 1 (1985).  
26 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
27 520 U.S. 461 (1997). 
28 542 U.S. 74 (2004). 
29 See Young, 470 U.S. at 19-20. 
30 See id. 
31 A collateral challenge is an appellate request when no timely objection was 
made at trial and after the the time allotted to file an appeal has expired. Because of 
this, collateral attacks present a higher hurdle to claimants. The type of review 
applied to this type of appeal is called the cause and actual prejudice standard. Under 
this standard a convicted defendant must show both (1) a good reason why he failed 
to make a timely objection and a timely appeal and (2) that the error caused him 
actual prejudice. This standard is more stringent than plain error review and requires 
a heightened showing of prejudice. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165-68 
(1982). 
5
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The Young Court summarized the plain error standard as a rule to 
be “used sparingly, solely under those circumstances in which a 
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”32 Importantly, in its 
description of the plain error standard, the Court included the second 
disjunctive prong of the Atkinson standard (serious effect on “the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”) while 
omitting the first (“if the errors are obvious”).33 The Court proceeded 
to explain that plain error analysis must also involve evaluating the 
error against the entire trial record.34 
The Court concluded that a prosecutor’s remarks expressing his 
personal belief as to the defendant’s guilt, and admonitions to the jury 
to “do their job” and convict the defendant, although improper, did not 
unfairly sway the jury.35 The majority found that the prosecutorial 
remarks did not undermine “the fairness of the trial and contribute to a 
miscarriage of justice” because the weight of the other evidence 
against the defendant was substantial enough for the jury to hang its 
hat on.36 The Court pointed to the fact that not a single witness had 
supported the defense and that the substantial and uncontradicted 
evidence indicated, beyond any doubt, the defendant’s deliberateness 
to defraud a customer.37 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and 
Justice Blackmun, cited to Atkinson and expressed that a plain error 
requires reversal of a conviction if the error may be said “either (1) to 
                                                 
32 Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, n. 14). 
33 See id. at 15; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (“In 
exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the 
public interest, may of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has 
been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis added). 
34 Young, 470 U.S. at 16. 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 Id. at 19.   
37 Id. (“Finally, the overwhelming evidence of respondent’s intent to defraud 
Apco and submit false oil certifications to the Government eliminates any lingering 
doubt that the prosecutor’s remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury’s deliberations or 
exploited the Government’s prestige in the eyes of the jury.”). 
6
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have created an unacceptable danger of prejudicial influence on the 
jury’s verdict, or (2) to have ‘seriously [affected] the … integrity or 
public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.”38 Notably, Justice 
Brennan kept the standard as a disjunctive test, with either the first or 
second prong satisfying the standard.39 After concluding that, contrary 
to the majority’s opinion, there were facts to establish that the 
prosecutor’s remarks led to “possible prejudice”40 to the defendant, 
Justice Brennan noted that the majority failed to consider the second 
disjunctive Atkinson prong - whether the prosecutor’s misconduct 
“seriously [affected] the … integrity or public reputation of [the] 
judicial proceedings.”41 Justice Brennan expressed concern that 
prosecutorial improprieties such as the one in this case might present a 
recurring problem thus endangering the integrity and public reputation 
of the judicial system.42 Similar to Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens, in 
a separate dissent, also highlighted the effect of the error on the 
integrity of the judicial system as an important plain error review 
factor.43  
In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988), three years after 
Young was decided, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Young 
Court had essentially broken down the Atkinson plain error standard 
into a two-part conjunctive inquiry: 44  “whether the error ‘seriously 
                                                 
38 Id. at 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
39 Id.  
40 It is important to note that the term “possible prejudice” is contrary to the 
majority’s belief that the error, when looked at against the evidence, must show that 
prejudice existed, not just that it was possible. Justice Brennan’s use of the term 
“prejudicial impact” further alludes to his belief that a showing of actual prejudice is 
not required. See id. at 31-32. 
41 Id. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
42 Id.  
43 See id. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand how anyone 
could dispute the proposition that the prosecutor’s comments were obviously 
prejudicial. Instead, the question is whether the degree of prejudice buttressed by the 
legitimate interest in deterring prosecutorial misconduct, is sufficient to warrant 
reversal.”). 
44 See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 35 (1988) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). It is important to note that the original plain 
7
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affected substantial rights,’ and whether the error ‘had an unfair 
prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.’”45 Although Justice 
Blackmun agreed that plain error analysis required some form of 
prejudicial impact inquiry, he expressed that the Young majority’s 
failure to define the prejudice prong did more harm than good.46 
Justice Blackmun proposed that to clear the confusion, the Court 
should either formulate a plain error test articulating the prejudice 
standard, or it should embrace plain error’s lack of rigidity and assert 
that its language in Young should not be interpreted as a test.47 He then 
suggested that a less rigid application of plain error review would be 
more faithful to the purpose of the plain error doctrine.48 
Seven years after Young was decided, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Olano
49 took the former of Justice Blackmun’s 
suggestions by creating a more rigid application of plain error review 
and positing a four-part inquiry focusing heavily on the issue of 
prejudice.50 The issue considered in Olano was whether it was plain 
error for the district court to have allowed an alternate juror to be 
present during deliberations without obtaining individual waivers from 
all seven defendants.51 In applying Young’s two-part plain error 
                                                                                                                   
error standard (Atkinson standard) was a disjunctive inquiry—plain error could be 
found if “the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (emphasis added). 
45 Robinson, 485 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added). Can’t use id- previous cite has 
two citations. 
46 Id. (“While any application of the plain-error doctrine necessarily includes 
some form of prejudice inquiry, the Court’s attempt to isolate that inquiry without 
giving it any substantive definition may have produced more mischief than clarity.”). 
47 See id. at 36-37. 
48 See id. (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160) (suggesting that appellate courts 
should have more discretion to consider circumstances in which allowing a 
“conviction to stand would severely undermine ‘the fairness integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”). 
49 507 U.S. 725 (1993).  
50 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). 
51 Id. at 729-30. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) prohibits the 
presence of alternate jurors during final jury deliberations: “… An alternate juror 
8
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analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the district 
court erred in allowing the alternate juror’s presence during 
deliberations.52 The Ninth Circuit explained that although the juror did 
not vocally participate in the deliberations, it was possible that the 
alternate juror conveyed his or her attitudes through body language, 
therefore having some effect on the other jurors’ decision.53 Next, the 
Ninth Circuit answered the two-part plain error inquiry by concluding 
that the violation was in plain error “because the violation was 
inherently prejudicial and because it infring[ed] upon a substantial 
right of the defendants.”54  
The Ninth Circuit’s application of plain error review prompted the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the 
standard.55 Attempting to unpack the broad language of Rule 52(b), the 
Court broke down plain error review into four distinct elements.56  
First, there must be an error.57 Any deviation from a legal rule is 
an “error” unless the defendant intentionally waived that rule.58 
Second, the error must be plain.59 In order for an error to be “plain,” 
the legal rule must be clear or obvious under current law.60 
                                                                                                                   
who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to 
consider its verdict.” Id. at 730 (quoting Fed R. Crim. P. 24(c)). 
52 Id. at 730.  
53 Id. at 730-31. 
54 Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
55 See id.  
56 See id. at 732-37. 
57 Id. at 732-33. 
58 Id. at 733-34 (“If a legal rule was violated during the district court 
proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an 
“error” within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely 
objection.”). As an example of intentional waiver, the court explained that a 
defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty cannot then have his 
conviction overturned by an appellate court on the ground that the trial court erred in 
not granting him a trial. Id. at 733.  
59 Id. at 734. 
60 Id. 
9
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Third, the error must affect substantial rights.61 The Court equated 
“substantial rights” with prejudice62 and interpreted it to mean that the 
plain error must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.63 In other words, the error must have been prejudicial to 
the defendant.64 In its attempt to articulate what “prejudice” meant in 
the context of plain error review, the Court explained that appellate 
courts must determine whether the error “had a prejudicial impact on 
the jury’s deliberations.”65 The Court emphasized that normally the 
defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 
“affecting substantial rights” prong.66 Fourth, plain error may only be 
noticed to prevent a miscarriage of justice.67 The Court explained that 
although an appellate court may correct a plain error that affected a 
defendant’s substantial rights, it is not obligated to do so unless it 
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”68 Specifically, the Court 
asserted that a plain error affecting substantial rights should only be 
corrected if, after satisfying the preceding three prongs, the error also 
                                                 
61 Id.  
62 The Court later proclaimed that it need not decide whether “affecting 
substantial rights” is always synonymous with “prejudicial.” Id. at 735. 
63 Id. at 734. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 at 17, n. 14). The Court 
differentiated harmless error review from plain error review and explained that 
although the two share the same basic inquiry, was the error prejudicial, in plain 
error review it is the defendant, and not the prosecution, that bears the burden to 
persuade the court that he or she was prejudiced by the error. Id.  
66 Id. at 735. The Court also stated that there might be a special category of forfeited 
errors that could be corrected regardless of their impact on the outcome of the case, 
as well as cases in which the errors should be presumed to be prejudicial and require 
no proof from the defendant. See id. Unfortunately, the Court declined to explain 
when those special circumstances would apply. 
67 Id. at 736.  
68 Id. (noting that in the collateral review context, “the term ‘miscarriage of 
justice’ means that the defendant is actually innocent,” but that Rule 52(b) is not a 
remedy only for cases in which the defendant is actually innocent). 
10
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“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”69  
After applying this four-part inquiry to the facts of the case, the 
majority concluded that although allowing the alternate juror to be 
present during the jury deliberations was plain error, the error did not 
affect the defendants’ substantial rights.70 The Court explained that the 
ultimate question in its application of the third prong, was whether the 
error affected the jury’s deliberations and verdict either specifically or 
presumptively.71 In holding that there was no prejudicial effect, 
therefore no substantial rights violation, the Court pointed to the fact 
that the record contained no direct evidence that the alternate juror’s 
presence influenced the verdict.72 Specifically, the Court explained 
that the defendants failed to show that the alternate juror either 
participated in the deliberation or produced a chilling effect on the 
regular jurors with his or her body language.73 The Court also declined 
to presume that the error was inherently prejudicial, as the Ninth 
Circuit had done.74 The Court reasoned that because the alternate juror 
was instructed by the judge not to participate in the deliberations, the 
Ninth Circuit should not have presumed that this instruction had been 
disregarded.75 Because the third prong of the Court’s plain error test 
was not satisfied, the Court did not consider the fourth—whether the 
error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”76 
Contrary to the majority, the three dissenters in Olano, led by 
Justice Stevens, concluded that the defendants’ substantial rights had 
                                                 
69 Id. 736-37 (“a plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, 
satisfy the Atkinson standard …”). 
70 Id. at 737-38. 
71 Id. at 739. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 740. 
75 See id. (“[It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow 
their instructions.”) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). 
76 Id. at 741. 
11
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been violated.77 Justice Stevens de-emphasized the importance of 
prejudicial impact in plain error review and instead stressed the 
importance of preventing injury to the integrity of the judicial 
system.78 Some defects affecting the jury’s deliberative function, he 
explained, are subject to reversal regardless of whether the defendant 
can show prejudice, “not only because it is so difficult to measure their 
effects on a jury’s decision, but also because such defects ‘undermine 
the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself.’”79  
The opinions in Johnson v. United States80 and United States v. 
Dominguez Benitez
81
 reflect how difficult Olano made plain error 
analysis to apply. In Johnson, the petitioner argued that the district 
court had committed plain error in deciding the element of materiality 
in a perjury case instead of submitting that issue to the jury.82 After 
determining that the current law stated that the jury must decide the 
question of materiality in a perjury case, the Court determined that the 
lower court had committed an error and the error was plain.83 The 
Court then decided that because the defendant failed to meet the fourth 
prong of the Olano test, it need not decide the third.84  
As in Olano, the Court in Johnson focused heavily on the 
prejudice component—the error’s effect on the outcome of the 
defendant’s case.85 However, instead of applying the prejudice inquiry 
to the third prong of the Olano test, the Court applied it to the fourth 
                                                 
77 Id. at 743 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. at 743-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (returning to the original Atkinson 
standard where plain error may be found “if the errors are obvious, or if they 
otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings”) (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 743 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)). 
80 520 U.S. 461 (1997) 
81 542 U.S. 74 (2004). 
82 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 463. 
83 Id. at 467. 
84 Id. at 469 (explaining that even assuming the error did affect substantial 
rights of the defendant, there was no plain error because the defendant was not able 
to meet the fourth Olano prong). 
85 See id. at 469-70 
12
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13 
(whether not noticing the error would result in a miscarriage of 
justice).86 The Court concluded that the fourth prong was not met 
because the defendant had failed to show that the error had prejudiced 
the outcome of his case.87 It explained that the evidence supporting the 
materiality of the false statement was overwhelming and 
uncontroverted at trial.88 Therefore, the Court continued, whether the 
issue of materiality would have gone to the jury instead of mistakenly 
going to the judge made no difference in the outcome of the trial; the 
jury, like the judge, would have also decided that the false statement 
was material.89 By applying a prejudice inquiry to the fourth prong, 
the Johnson Court expanded the weight to be given to prejudice, 
creating a higher hurdle for plain error appellants and pushing the 
focus of plain error review further away from the original Atkinson 
standard.90 
In Dominguez Benitez, the Court asserted a standard of 
measurement for determining whether the degree of prejudice was 
enough to satisfy Olano’s substantial rights prong.91 The Court 
followed United States v. Bagley,92 in invoking a reasonable 
probability standard—a requirement that a defendant show “a 
reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”93 The Court explained that a 
court may notice a plain error if after reviewing the entire record, the 
                                                 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 Id. at 470.  
89 See id.  
90 Recall that the original standard in Atkinson was more broadly focused on 
the error’s effect on the integrity of the court and the public’s faith in it. See United 
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160; see also New York C.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 
U.S. 310, 318-319 (emphasizing that trials are never purely just about the litigants 
involved and the public’s interests must be served).  
91 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-83 (2004). 
92 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
93 Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 82-83.  
13
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probability of a different result is “‘sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome of the proceeding.”94  
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia drew attention to the confused 
state of prejudice standards.95 He pointed out that the Court at the time 
had adopted at least four different standards for assessing prejudice.96 
Among these were: (a) the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard for use on direct review of a constitutional error and 
conviction;97 (b) the substantial and injurious effect or influence 
standard for use on collateral review;98 (c) the reasonable probability 
standard such as the one used by the majority in the present case;99 and 
(d) the less-defendant friendly more likely than not standard for use on 
claims of newly discovered evidence after conviction.100 Noting the 
difficulty of applying different gradations of prejudice to hypothesized 
outcomes,101 he concluded that the traditional “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” and “more likely than not” standards were the only workable 
standards for plain error prejudice analysis.102 
 
                                                 
94 Id. at 83. 
95 See id. at 86-87 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
96 Id. at 86.  
97 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), superseded by statute, 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 
(2016), as recognized in Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2010). 
98 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 
99 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1976); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
100 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. 
101 See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 86 (“Such ineffable gradations of 
probability seem to me quite beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to 
grasp, and thus harmful rather than helpful to the consistency and rationality of 
judicial decisionmaking.”). 
102 Id. at 87 (“I would hold that, where a defendant has failed to object at trial, 
and thus has the burden of proving that a mistake he failed to prevent had an effect 
on his substantial rights, he must show that effect to be probable, that is, more likely 
than not.”). 
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C. Inconsistent Application of Plain Error Review by the Seventh 
Circuit  
 
The confusion as to the correct application of plain error analysis 
has led the Seventh Circuit to produce inconsistent holdings.103 In 
United States v. Paladino,104 the Seventh Circuit Court acknowledged 
this confusion as it struggled to differentiate the “substantial rights” 
prong from the “fairness and integrity” prong of Olano.105 It suggested 
two different sets of interpretations for both of these prongs.106  
The first, more rigid, interpretation was that the third element, 
“substantial rights,” required a showing of prejudice—but for the 
error, the verdict might have been different. The fourth element, 
“fairness, integrity, or public reputation” required a showing that, 
absent intervention by an appellate court, there would be a miscarriage 
of justice—the result would be intolerable (such as the conviction of 
an innocent person). 107 
The second, more lenient, interpretation suggested by the Seventh 
Circuit was that the showing of prejudice should be applied to the 
fourth prong, not the third.108 The court proposed that in this second 
interpretation, “substantial rights” referred to an important right, rather 
than a mere technical right, and that to satisfy the fourth prong, a 
defendant must show prejudice – the likelihood that the verdict ‘was 
actually affected by the error.’”109  
                                                 
103 Compare United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 
F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005) 
with United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc 
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016). 
104 401 F.3d 471 (7th Circ. 2005). 
105 See id. at 481 (“[T]he difference between the ‘substantial rights’ and 




108 Id.  
109 Id. at 482 (emphasis added).  
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Even though the majority declined to express which interpretation 
the court should adopt,110 it proceeded to explain plain error review in 
terms of requiring a showing of probable prejudice and of 
innocence.111 In his dissent, Judge Ripple, joined by Judge Kanne, 
acknowledged that the majority had implicitly adopted the more 
stringent plain error interpretation, and he rejected this rigid 
interpretation.112 
Similar to the error in Resnick, the alleged error in United States v. 
Hills involved a Fifth Amendment violation.113 In Hills, a defendant 
who had been convicted of conspiracy and filing false tax returns, 
alleged that the prosecution had committed misconduct when it made 
negative remarks in its closing argument about invoking the Fifth 
Amendment right not to testify.114 Since the defense had failed to 
object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial, the court began its 
analysis by iterating the Olano four-part plain error review test.115  
The court first determined that the prosecution’s comments were 
made in error because it cast the defendant’s invocation of her 
constitutional right in a negative light, which the court explained was 
the very thing the right against self-incrimination sought to protect.116 
                                                 
110 See id. (reasoning that since there was plain error under the more rigid test, 
the court need not pick which of the two interpretations should be applied).  
111 See id. (“If an error is committed and the defendant is convicted, the 
appellate court has only to consider whether the defendant would probably have 
been acquitted had the error not occurred. If so—if the error may well have 
precipitated a miscarriage of justice (which the conviction of an innocent person 
is)—it is plain error and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.”). Importantly, the 
challenged error in this case happened during the sentencing phase as opposed to the 
guilt determination phase. See id.  
112 See id. at 486 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
113 618 F.3d 619, 639 (7th Cir. 2010). 
114 Id.  The prosecution made the following remarks: “And you don’t really 
need to worry about the Fifth Amendment protection unless you’re worried that 
you’re [d]oing something illegal;” “They’re using the Fifth Amendment not as a 
shield to protect themselves from incrimination, but as a sword to prevent the IRS 
from getting the information that they are entitled to.” Id. at 640. 
115 Id. at 639-40. 
116 Id. at 641. 
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Next, the court held that the district court’s allowance of the 
prosecutorial statements was plain error for two reasons.117 First, the 
court explained that the district judge had expressly warned the 
prosecution to refrain from referring to the Fifth Amendment, and yet 
the prosecution proceeded to reference the Fifth Amendment 
anyway.118 Second, and most importantly, the court applied the 
prejudice test to the second prong.119 The court honed in on the 
egregiousness of the error itself explaining that there was more than a 
“nontrivial possibility” that the references might have determined the 
outcome of the case.120 In applying the crucial prejudice test to the 
error itself, the court shifted the focus of the analysis to the gravity of 
the error itself, away from the determinative influence of other 
evidence.  
After establishing that the prosecutorial remarks were plain error, 
the court moved on to the third Olano inquiry—whether the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.121 The analysis the court 
employed in determining this third prong consisted of a consideration 
of five harmless error122 factors: “(1) the intensity and frequency of the 
references, (2) which party elected to pursue the line of questioning, 
(3) the use to which the prosecution put the silence, (4) the trial 
judge’s opportunity to grant a motion for a mistrial or give a curative 
instruction, and (5) the quantum of other evidence indicative of 
guilt.”123  
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Harmless error, codified as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), is 
another type of direct appellate review where there is a “consideration of error raised 
by a defendant’s timely objection, but subject to an opportunity on the Government’s 
part to carry the burden of showing that any error was harmless, as having no effect 
on the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 
(2002). 
123 Hills, 618 F.3d at 641. 
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Subsequent to applying these five factors, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the prosecutorial remarks had affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights.124 The court explained that despite the judge’s 
explicit warning to refrain from doing so, the prosecution twice made 
reference to the Fifth Amendment, the judge did not procure any 
curative measures to prevent the jury from making improper use of the 
remarks, and all of the evidence against the defendant was 
circumstantial.125  
Finally, in concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, the court 
reasoned that if it failed to correct this error, the government would 
feel entitled to intrude on defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights in 
future cases.126 The Seventh Circuit explained that this would 
disenfranchise the public from their constitutional right, thereby 
injuring the integrity of the judicial system and the respect for 
constitutional rule of law.127  
 
UNITED STATES V. RESNICK 
 
A. Resnick Opinion 
 
The Resnick majority, consisting of Judge Wood and Judge Sykes, 
held that the prosecution’s incriminating use of Resnick’s refusal to 
take a polygraph exam did not rise to the level of plain error.128 Justice 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 641-42. Curiously, earlier in the opinion, the court had rejected 
another appeal made by the defendant in which she claimed that the evidence 
introduced against her at trial had not been sufficient to support both of her 
convictions. In addressing this claim, the court concluded there was strong enough 
circumstantial evidence for her conspiracy conviction, and that “there was more than 
enough circumstantial evidence to establish that she was guilty of filing false tax 
returns. Id. at 638-39. 
126 Id. at 642. 
127 Id. 
128 United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc 
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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Bauer dissented.129 After applying the Olano four-pronged test for 
plain error, the court reasoned that any error by the prosecution was 
not plain and did not affect Resnick’s substantial rights in light of the 
whole record.130 
 
1. Plain Error 
 
The court explained that it had no need to answer the first Olano 
question of whether the prosecution’s introduction of Resnick’s silence 
was erroneous.131 It reasoned that because any error was not plain, 
there was no need to decide this preliminary inquiry.132 In considering 
whether the prosecution’s actions were plain error, the court discussed 
two potential types of error the prosecution might have committed—
evidentiary and constitutional.133  
First, the court considered whether the district court violated any 
evidentiary rules by admitting Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph 
test into evidence.134 The Seventh Circuit began by agreeing with 
Resnick about the dubiousness of polygraph exams and the risk of 
unfair prejudice.135 It noted that while the judicial and scientific 
communities were well aware of the criticism polygraph tests face, lay 
people still assigned the polygraph an “aura of infallibility,” which 
could cause jurors to heavily rely on polygraph evidence to assess 
credibility and guilt.136 After asserting a litany of cases across different 
jurisdictions that rejected polygraph evidence, either through dicta or 
                                                 
129 Id. at 890. 
130 See id. at 898. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 896-98. 
134 Id. at 896-97 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 897. 
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per se rules, the Seventh Circuit averred that its own precedent pointed 
only towards the exclusion of polygraph evidence.137  
However, the court also stated that, unlike other circuits, it had 
never established a blanket rule excluding the use of polygraph 
evidence.138 Instead, the court continued, the Seventh Circuit had 
given district courts substantial discretion on the issue.139 The court 
concluded by stating that because the law on polygraph evidence was 
not settled and the case against Resnick was “airtight,” it could not 
definitively say that admitting the refusal to submit to a polygraph was 
plain error.140  
 Next, the court turned to the issue of whether Resnick 
suffered a Fifth Amendment violation by having his right to silence 
used against him.141 The court began by acknowledging that a 
polygraph examination is almost always a custodial interrogation 
triggering Miranda rights.142 Therefore, the court continued, “absent a 
waiver of [F]ifth [A]mendment rights, a person may not be compelled 
to submit to a polygraph examination.”143 The court then recognized 
that the “natural corollary” to that rule is that a defendant’s refusal to 
submit to a polygraph cannot be used against him as evidence.144 It 
nonetheless reasoned that because the Seventh Circuit had never 
explicitly held that the refusal to take a polygraph violated the Fifth 
Amendment, any error committed by the district court was not 
plain.145 Finally, the court added that any prejudice to Resnick was 
                                                 
137 Id. at 896-97 (“It is no surprise that our own decisions have, in practice, 
pointed in only one direction: affirming the exclusion of polygraph evidence.”). 




142 Id. Miranda rights include the right to remain silent and the right to an 
attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). A custodial 
interrogation is any type of police questioning while an individual is deprived of his 
freedom in any significant way. Id. at 478. 
143 Resnick, 823 F.3d at 897.  
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 898. 
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minimal, as his refusal to take a polygraph was mentioned only once 
by each side during closing, the other evidence against him was 
strong, and his credibility could not have been impaired since he did 
not testify at trial.146 
 
2. Substantial Rights 
 
The court concluded by noting that Resnick failed to make a 
specific showing of prejudice in order to satisfy the substantial rights 
prong of the Olano test.147 It argued that because the record as a whole 
pointed towards Resnick’s guilt, any error committed during his trial 
had no effect on his substantial rights.148 
 
B. Justice Bauer’s Dissent 
 
Contrary to the majority, Justice Bauer argued that the district 
court had committed reversible plain error.149 He asserted that the 
district court’s errors were both constitutional and evidentiary in 
nature.150 In addition to noting that precedent concerning evidentiary 
rules clearly established that polygraph evidence should be excluded, 
Justice Bauer explained that precedent also clearly and obviously  
established that the Fifth Amendment prohibited a defendant’s right to 
silence being used against him.151 He asserted that the district court 
                                                 
146 Id. at 898. 
147 Id.   
148 Id. 
149 Id. (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
150 Id. at 901 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 899 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination … grant[s] … an absolute right.”) (quoting Greene v. Finley, 749 
F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1984)). Judge Bauer further noted that “the government is 
‘prohibit[ed] … from treat[ing] a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at 
trial as substantive evidence of guilt.’” Id. (citing United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 
F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, “[i]f a defendant refuses to testify or 
invokes his Miranda rights, the prosecutor cannot comment on this refusal to the 
jury.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966)). 
21
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had violated a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system by 
imposing a penalty on a defendant for his exercising of a constitutional 
privilege.152  
Justice Bauer was also disturbed by the majority’s use of other 
evidence against Resnick in its plain error analysis.153 He explained 
that the majority’s reasoning implied that a court could ignore a 
defendant’s rights if the evidence against him was strong enough.154 
He continued by asserting that the majority had misunderstood 
Olano’s fourth prong, and thereby was misinterpreting plain error 
review by implying that a defendant must prove his innocence in order 
for a plain error correction to be warranted.155 The only issue on 
appeal, Justice Bauer argued, was whether Resnick received a fair 
trial, and the gravity of the district court’s error indicated that he had 
not.156  
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WRONGLY DECIDED RESNICK 
  
The Seventh Circuit erred in its Resnick decision in four ways: (1) 
it failed to recognize that evidence incriminating a defendant for 
refusing to take a polygraph clearly violates the Fifth Amendment; (2) 
it ignored the gravity of the error; (3) it placed too much emphasis on 
the other evidence against Resnick; and (4) it ignored the error’s 
injurious effect to the integrity of the judicial system. The Seventh 
Circuit’s wrongful holding in Resnick is not surprising, however, given 
the disarrayed state of the plain error doctrine. 
 
                                                 
152 Resnick, 823 F.3d at 901 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
154 Id.  
155 Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court noted in Olano that ‘we have never held that’ 
remand for plain error ‘is only warranted in cases of actual innocence.’ This court 
has reaffirmed that a defendant need not ‘establish actual innocence’ under Olano 
plain error review to trigger remand.” (citing United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 
771 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
156 Id.  
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A. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Appropriately Regard a Well-
Recognized Constitutional Protection 
 
 The Resnick majority asserted that because the Seventh Circuit 
had never before explicitly held that the refusal to take a polygraph 
test implicated the Fifth Amendment, the prosecution’s use of 
Resnick’s refusal to take such a test was not plain error.157 However, 
the court’s reasoning for such a conclusion was acutely unsound and 
contradictory.  
The majority spent a considerable amount of time explaining why 
polygraph examinations trigger Fifth Amendment protections.158 The 
court not only contended that polygraph examinations elicit Fifth 
Amendment protections, but also that generally, that a defendant’s 
refusal to submit to a polygraph may not be used as incriminating 
evidence.159 To support this contention, the court cited to other circuit 
court opinions which have explicitly held that a defendant’s refusal to 
submit to a polygraph examination cannot be used against him.160 The 
court noted that a polygraph examination is almost always a custodial 
interrogation, which triggers Miranda rights, particularly the right to 
silence.161 Therefore, the court asserted, a person may not be 
compelled to submit to a polygraph test, assuming the individual has 
not waived his right.162 
Perplexingly, after acknowledging that using a defendant’s refusal 
to submit to a polygraph violated the Fifth Amendment, the majority 
concluded that the prosecution’s use of Resnick’s refusal was not a 
plain error, as it had “never before held that the refusal to take a 
polygraph implicate[d] the Fifth Amendment.”163 This implied that in 
                                                 
157 Id. at 898.  
158 Id. at 897-98 
159 Id. at 897. 
160 Id. at 897-98 (citing Garmon v. Lumpkin Cnty., Ga., 878 F.2d 1406, 1410 
(11th Cir. 1989) and United States v. St. Clair, 855 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 1988)).  
161 Id. at 897. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 898.  
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order for a rule to be “clear,” the Seventh Circuit must have  
previously ruled explicitly on a specific matter.  
However, a rule, law, or precedent need not specify every type of 
circumstance which would fall under its purview. For example, an 
ordinance that prohibits motor vehicles from travelling in excess of 
thirty-five miles per hour on a roadway need not specify all modes of 
transportation qualifying as “motor vehicles.” Perhaps the first thing 
that comes to mind is a car, but it would be illogical to reason that 
because the ordinance didn’t specifically state that it also applied to 
motorcycles, motorcycles somehow fell out of the ordinance’s ambit; a 
motorcycle is a type of motor vehicle after all.  
Likewise, just because the Seventh Circuit has never explicitly 
ruled that a polygraph examination triggers the Fifth Amendment right 
to silence, it does not mean that a polygraph exam doesn’t fall under 
the Fifth Amendment ambit. Just like in the motor vehicle example 
above, a polygraph examination is a type of custodial interrogation, 
which the Supreme Court has clearly stated triggers the Fifth 
Amendment right to silence and to not have that silence used against 
the accused.164 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Ignored the Gravity of the Error 
 
The court failed to notice how the credibility of Resnick’s case 
might have been undermined by the prosecution’s comments about his 
refusal to submit to a polygraph. The court itself acknowledged that 
polygraph evidence entails a substantial possibility of prejudice 
because “the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can 
lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt.”165 
This misguided reliance, the court continued, had the possibility of 
leading jurors to believe that a person who refuses to take a polygraph 
                                                 
164 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
165 Resnick, 823 F.3d at 897 (quoting Unites States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 
314 (1998). 
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has something to hide.166 The court acknowledged that because of this 
reason, Seventh Circuit decisions reflected the unanimous exclusion of 
polygraph evidence.167 However, the court dismissed the importance 
of the prosecution’s actions in this case, reasoning that the Seventh 
Circuit had never adopted a blanket rule excluding polygraph 
evidence.168  
In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
egregiousness of introducing a defendant’s exercise of his 
constitutional right to silence as incriminating evidence.169Although it 
refused to hold that any and all constitutional violations constituted 
reversible error, the Court equated the flagrancy of admitting a 
defendant’s constitutional silence as evidence with a coerced 
confession,170 and held that such an inference of guilt could not be 
considered a harmless error. “An error in admitting plainly relevant 
evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant 
cannot, under Fahy,171 be conceived of as harmless.”172 
In his dissent, Judge Bauer also recognized the abhorrence of this 
type of error. Judge Bauer explained that the error committed by the 
district court in Resnick, violated a bedrock principle of the criminal 
justice system—imposing a penalty for exercising a constitutional 
right.173 He correctly pointed out that by admitting Resnick’s refusal to 
                                                 
166 Id. at 896. 
167 Id. at 897. 
168 Id.  
169 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) 
170 Id. 
171 Fahey v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (concluding that 
constitutional errors which had a reasonable possibility of contributing to the 
conviction should not be treated as harmless). 
172 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; id. at 26 (explaining that “Petitioners [were] 
entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences.”). 
173 United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 901(7th Cir. 2016) (Bauer, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016); see United States v. 
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 36 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910)) (recognizing that placing more weight on 
constitutional errors when assessing plain error is approved by precedent).  
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take a polygraph as substantive evidence, it implicitly led the jury to 
believe that polygraph tests are reliable and probative.174 This 
misguided belief, he argued, tainted the entire case by inducing the 
jurors to place an undue amount of weight on Resnick’s refusal to take 
a polygraph, thereby undermining Resnick’s credibility.175  
Finally, the court failed to take the context in which the comments 
by the prosecution were made into account. The Supreme Court has 
held that a prosecutor’s wrongful comments must be looked at in 
context to determine their egregiousness.176 In Young, the Court held 
that the prosecution’s comments about its personal beliefs as to the 
defendant’s guilt177 were not plain error.178 The Court reasoned that 
because the prosecution’s comments came as a response to the defense 
counsel’s insinuation that not even the prosecution believed in the 
defendant’s guilt, the prosecution was merely defending his personal 
impression since defense counsel had asked for it.179 The Court 
explained that any potential harm from the prosecutor’s remark was 
mitigated by the fact that the jury understood that the comments were 
only made to defend an insinuation.180 The Court concluded that 
although the prosecution’s comments were wrongful, they did not 
compromise the jury’s deliberations.181  
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit has held that 
prosecutorial comments referencing a defendant’s constitutional rights 
must be viewed in context of whether (1) the prosecutor manifestly 
                                                 
174 Resnick, 823 F.3d at 901-02 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
175 Id. (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
176 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-11, 13-14 (1985); Robinson, 
485 U.S. at 33 (explaining that a prosecutorial comment as to a defendant’s silence 
must be looked at in the context under which the comment was made).  
177 A prosecutor may not comment as to his or her own personal belief as to 
the defendant’s guilt because “the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur 
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment 
rather than its own view of the evidence.” Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19. 
178 Id. at 20. 
179 Id. at 17-18. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 18. 
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intended to use the defendant’s exercise of his right as evidence of 
guilt, or (2) the character of the remark would lead a jury to naturally 
and necessarily treat it as evidence of defendant’s guilt.182 In 
Resnick,183 the prosecution very clearly intended to use Resnick’s 
refusal to submit to a polygraph as substantive evidence of his guilt. 
First, the prosecution used Resnick’s refusal in its case in chief.184 
During direct examination, one of the FBI agents who searched 
Resnick’s home testified that Resnick had declined to take a polygraph 
without speaking to his counsel first and that, to his knowledge, 
Resnick never did end up taking one.185 Moreover, during its closing 
argument, the prosecution told the jury it wanted to leave them with 
defendant’s lies.186 It proceeded to publish a demonstrative exhibit 
listing Resnick’s answers to interview questions and noted that 
Resnick had refused to take a polygraph.187 The prosecution then 
asserted that this refusal, coupled with his other denials, evidenced 
Resnick’s consciousness of guilt.188 Both of these instances, especially 
when coupled together, are an explicit, barefaced use of Resnick’s 
exercise of his right to silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 
Furthermore, it is indisputable that these overtly incriminating remarks 
would be very likely to lead a jury to treat them as such.  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Placed an Inordinate Amount of 
Emphasis on the Other Evidence Against Resnick When 
Evaluating Prejudice 
 
By focusing on the “overwhelming” evidence against Resnick to 
ultimately conclude that Resnick’s substantial rights were not affected, 
                                                 
182 United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2008). 
183 United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc 
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016). 
184 Id. at 892. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 900 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
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the Seventh Circuit turned plain error analysis into an inquiry over 
Resnick’s guilt or innocence—a question not at issue under plain error 
analysis.189 Most disturbingly, as Judge Bauer pointed out in his 
dissent, the court’s holding implied that a court may ignore egregious 
violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights if the evidence against 
him is strong enough.190 Because jurors are not mandated to give the 
reasons for their decisions, in most cases it would be impossible for a 
defendant to show that an error influenced the jurors’ decision.191 As 
Judge Bauer pointed out in his dissent in Resnick, only a defendant 
who could show he was innocent would be able to make a showing 
that he suffered actual prejudice at the hands of an error.192 For these 
reasons, instead of considering the “overwhelming evidence” against 
Resnick as the dispositive factor, the Seventh Circuit should have 
followed the precedent set by Hills193 to determine whether Resnick’s 
substantial rights were affected. 
Notwithstanding the fact that neither the Atkinson standard nor the 
language of Rule 52(b) implicate the weight of evidence against the 
accused as part of plain error analysis, Judge Bauer, in his dissent on 
petition for rehearing en banc,194 aptly noted that “[t]here is no 
evidentiary demarcation line that when traversed with enough 
damning evidence of guilt permits the government and the court to 
deny a criminal defendant the right to a fair jury trial.”195 
                                                 
189 See id. at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“Resnick’s guilt is not at issue on 
appeal; we only review whether he received a fair trial.”). 
190 See id.  
191 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 743 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that some errors bearing on the jury’s deliberations are 
subject to reversal partly because it is very difficult to measure the errors’ effect on 
the jury’s decision). 
192 See Resnick, 823 F.3d at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
193 The court in Hills applied a five-factor harmless error analysis to determine 
whether a defendant’s substantial rights were affected. United States v. Hills, 618 
F.3d 619, 641 (7th Cir. 2010). 
194 Judge Posner, Judge Flaum, and Judge Kanne joined in the dissent. 
195 United States v. Resnick, 835 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2016) (dissent from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
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D. The Court Ignored the Injurious Effect of the Error to the 
Integrity of the Judicial System. 
 
As explained earlier, the Atkinson Court was concerned with an 
error’s broad effect on the integrity of the judicial system.196 However, 
the Seventh Circuit made no mention of this principle in its Resnick 
decision. As Judge Bauer recognized, the gravity of the district court’s 
error affected the integrity of judicial proceedings.197 The implications 
of allowing this type of error undermine the authority of the 
Constitution and give the government a carte blanche to violate a 
defendant’s rights at trial. As long as there is enough evidence against 
the accused, the prosecution may feel free to use a defendant’s 
constitutional privileges against him. Just as the Seventh Circuit 
should have followed its decision in Hills to determine whether 
Resnick’s substantial rights had been affected, it should have also 
turned to Hills in its analysis of Olano’s fourth prong. In Hills, the 
court embraced Atkinson’s principle—the court looked beyond the 
effect of the error to just the defendant.198 Instead, the court accounted 
for the error’s injury to the integrity of the judicial system and for the 
demoralization of the Constitution.199 I think you need a concluding 
thought here to tie this section up. 
 
HOW PLAIN ERROR REVIEW SHOULD BE CORRECTED 
 
Given the confusion created by the complexity of the Olano four-
part inquiry it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit wrongly 
decided Resnick. This confusion is patently apparent in the 
discrepancy between the Hills decision and the Resnick opinion 
despite the similarity of the facts. Today’s version of plain error 
                                                 
196 See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (citing New York 
Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 and Brasfield v. United States, 272 
U.S. 448, 450 (1926)). 
197 Resnick, 823 F.3d at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
198 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 642. 
199 Id. 
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analysis has strayed too far from the principles supporting Atkinson. 
Instead of focusing on the gravity of an error or its effect on the 
integrity of the court, today’s standard narrowly focuses on the effect 
of the error on the particular outcome of a case. This is evidenced by 
Olano’s requirement of a showing of actual prejudice by a defendant. 
As discussed earlier in this Comment, this is not a part of the plain 
error doctrine. Instead, this extremely high hurdle is more reminiscent 
of the more stringent cause and actual prejudice standard as explained 
in United States v. Frady.200 For all practical purposes, a showing of 
actual prejudice essentially requires that a defendant show that he is 
innocent because of the extreme difficulty of showing that a jury 
would have decided differently had the error not been introduced.  
This required showing of prejudice is at the heart of the problem 
with today’s plain error doctrine. No court has been able to quantify 
exactly how much prejudice must be shown in plain error analysis. 
Adding to the confusion is Olano’s failure to unpack what it meant by 
asserting that plain error must be found only in cases where failure to 
correct the error would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”201 The 
Olano Court explained that in collateral review jurisprudence, the term 
“miscarriage of justice” meant that the defendant was actually 
innocent, and while the court asserted that this would suffice to satisfy 
the fourth prong of its test, a showing of innocence was not 
necessary.202 The problem, however, is that the Court failed to indicate 
what else besides a showing of innocence qualified as a miscarriage of 
justice under plain error review. 
In order to repair the plain error doctrine, courts must return to the 
principle in which the doctrine was grounded—namely the need for 
public faith in the integrity of the judicial system. This requires that 
courts return to focusing plain error analysis on the egregiousness of 
the error and its effect on the public’s confidence in the fairness of 
                                                 
200 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 
201 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1993). Recall that Olano 
equated miscarriage of justice with its fourth prong of “seriously affecting the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.  
202 Id. at 736.  
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judicial proceedings. In interpreting Rule 52(b), courts must be 
cognizant of these principles. The Hills decision provides a good 
working standard for application of the complicated “substantial 
rights” inquiry. The five factors the Hills court applied to determine 
whether the defendant’s substantial rights had been imposed on203 are 
in keeping with Rule 52(b)’s language, which only requires that the 
error affect substantial rights. Importantly, by applying the five factors 
used in Hills, other evidence weighing on the defendant’s guilt is 
relegated to being just one of five factors to be weighed, rather than 
being dispositive.  
Plain error review would be best served if the Olano test was 
retained but altered to reflect the spirit of Atkinson. First, the first and 
second prongs should be retained to determine the gravity of the error, 
with constitutional violations studied more scrupulously. Second, the 
test should include the factors in Hills204 to determine whether a 
defendant’s substantial rights were violated. Finally, an appellate court 
should consider whether the judicial system would be harmed in light 
of the egregiousness of the error. Under this plain error analysis, 
Resnick’s conviction would have more than likely been vacated and 





Plain error review was grounded in the principle that courts 
should correct errors that, if left unrectified, could undermine the 
                                                 
203 These five factors are: (1) the intensity and frequency of the wrongful 
prosecutorial remarks; (2) which party elected to pursue the line of questioning; (3) 
the use to which the prosecution put the defendant’s Fifth Amendment silence; (4) 
the trial judge’s opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or give a curative 
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integrity of the judicial system.205 The Atkinson plain error standard 
embodied this principle. The United States Supreme Court, however, 
has over time strayed from this original standard by focusing more 
narrowly on the outcosme of a particular trial. The complexity and 
vagueness of the current doctrine has created confusion and 
inconsistency of decisions, including within the Seventh Circuit. The 
doctrine must be revised to look beyond any damage an uncorrected 
error may cause to a single individual. Instead, plain error analysis 





                                                 
205 See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936); New York C.R. 
Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1929); Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 
448, 450 (1926). 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/2
